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SUMMARY
A regional, multistate investigation into a June–August 2013 cyclosporiasis outbreak was
conducted in Nebraska, Iowa, and neighbouring states. Cases were conﬁrmed on the basis of
laboratory and clinical ﬁndings. Of 227 cases in Iowa (n = 140) and Nebraska (n = 87) residents,
162 (71%) reported dining at chain A/B restaurants – 96% reported house salad consumption. A
case-control study identiﬁed chain A/B house salad as the most likely vehicle. Traceback was
conducted to ascertain production lot codes of bagged salad mix (iceberg and romaine lettuce, red
cabbage, and carrots) served as house salad in implicated restaurants. A single production lot code
of salad mix supplied by both a common producer and distributor was linked to the majority of
conﬁrmed cases in persons reporting regional chain A/B exposure. The salad mix linked to illnesses
contained imported romaine lettuce from two separate single-grower ﬁelds-of-origin and 51
additional ﬁeld from another grower.
Key words: Cyclospora, epidemiology, foodborne infections, outbreaks, parasites.

I N T RO D U C T I O N
During 2013, US state and local public health ofﬁcials,
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), and the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) investigated increased incidence of cyclosporiasis

* Author for correspondence: B. F. Buss, DVM, MPH, DACVPM,
CDC Career Epidemiology Field Ofﬁcer (CEFO), Nebraska
Department of Health and Human Services, 301 Centennial Mall
South, PO Box 95026, Lincoln, NE 68509, USA.
(Email: bryan.buss@nebraska.gov)
† These authors contributed equally as joint ﬁrst authors.

[1, 2]. Of 631 US cases reported during June–August
2013, at least 25 were linked to Mexico-origin cilantro
only in Texas [3]. In Iowa and Nebraska, respectively,
140 and 87 cases occurred. Investigations in these US
Upper Midwest states linked illnesses to producer A,
Mexico-origin salad mix containing iceberg and romaine
lettuce, red cabbage, and carrots [2]. This product was
served in two distinctly different restaurant chains (A/
B) that shared both a common supply channel and parent corporation, company D [4]. We report the methods
and ﬁndings that implicated the chain A/B salad mix
and additional investigative activities that further
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establish the speciﬁc salad-mix ingredient as the cause of
many cyclosporiasis cases in the US Upper Midwest.
Cyclosporiasis is an intestinal infection caused by the
unicellular, coccidian parasite Cyclospora cayetanensis
[5]. Humans are the only known host of this species
transmitted by ingestion of infective oocysts, generally
through contaminated food or water. Incubation typically ranges from 2 to 14 days, but can be longer.
Watery diarrhoea is the most common symptom [6,
7]. Cyclosporiasis generally responds well to treatment,
but prolonged illness lasting several weeks to months is
common in untreated persons [5, 6]. Oocysts shed in
faeces of infected persons require days to weeks of
favourable environmental conditions to sporulate and
become infective [5]. Direct person-to-person spread
is an unlikely mode of transmission [6, 7]. Although
Cyclospora is not considered endemic in the United
States, outbreaks since the mid-1990s have been linked
to fresh, imported produce including raspberries, basil,
snow peas, and mesclun lettuce [5].
Beyond the initial outbreak reports [1, 2, 4, 8, 9], limited additional information was published to link illnesses to the chain A/B salad mix, or to establish the
origin of its contamination. We conducted a regional,
multistate investigation into cases in Nebraska, Iowa,
Missouri, Kansas, Wisconsin, and Illinois with the
objectives of identifying production lot codes (PCs) of
implicated products, speciﬁc salad-mix ingredient(s)
associated with illness, and the growing ﬁelds where
product contamination might have occurred. These
ﬁndings helped guide environmental assessment activities [8] and can inform prevention recommendations.

METHODS
Case ascertainment
All laboratory-conﬁrmed cyclosporiasis cases identiﬁed from 1 June to 31 August 2013 in Nebraska,
Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Wisconsin, and Illinois
were investigated. Structured questionnaires were
administered to study food exposures within 14 days
of illness onset. A conﬁrmed case was deﬁned as
laboratory-conﬁrmed Cyclospora infection in a person
with symptom onset from 1 June to 31 August 2013
with no history of travel outside the United States or
Canada 14 days prior to illness onset. After initial
interviews suggested an association with chain A/B,
a reﬁned questionnaire was administered focusing
on fresh produce and chain A/B restaurant salad exposures, including lettuce type.

Douglas County environmental investigation and
case-control study
An environmental investigation was conducted in
Douglas County (Nebraska) to identify chain A and
chain B menu item ingredients, including salad types
and garnishes. Using restaurant menus, food exposure
and illness histories were obtained using a standardized questionnaire for conﬁrmed ill persons and
their dining partners. A case-control study assessed
the food exposures of ill patrons and dining partners
who reported eating at chain A/B restaurants in this
county. A probable case was deﬁned as clinically compatible illness in a person reporting onset 42 weeks
after sharing a chain A/B meal with a conﬁrmed ill
person. Non-ill dining partners served as unmatched
controls. Exposures assessed included the most commonly reported main entrées and other items which
shared common supply channels. Data were analysed
using Epi-Info v. 7 (CDC, USA) and SAS (SAS
Institute Inc., USA).

Regional product traceback
Traceback information collected included names of
growers, producers, distributors, and the lot codes of
various shipments. All data collected were anonymized
to protect commercial conﬁdentiality. Company
D named and provided the locations for its chain A/
B restaurants in Nebraska, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Wisconsin, South Dakota, and Illinois. A product
traceback investigation was initiated to identify
PCs of chain A/B salad-mix product likely causing
restaurant-associated illness and to ascertain product
origin. Figure 1 gives an overview of distribution channels from producer A’s Mexican processing facility to
ﬁnal points-of-service.
Chain A/B house salad exposure compared to product
distribution and service dates
We mapped exposures of ill persons and superimposed
these on the entire distributor X chain A/B supply
chain. We also constructed an epidemic curve to plot
dates when PC-speciﬁc salad-mix products were delivered and thus available for possible service at each
chain A/B restaurant (assuming 14-day shelf life) for
comparison to corresponding dining dates of ill persons. For the latter, we restricted analysis to only
conﬁrmed ill persons reporting speciﬁc restaurant location, house salad consumption, and known dining date.

Cyclosporiasis outbreak linked to romaine lettuce
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Fig. 1. General overview of the possible distribution channels* by which potentially contaminated producer A salad mix
was supplied from Mexico-origin growers and ﬁelds (growing lots) through distributor X† to chain A/B restaurants in
Iowa, Nebraska, and surrounding states, May–June 2013. (* This ﬂowchart is provided only as an overview of the
distribution channels described in the text and associated tables. Accordingly, the channels depicted are not intended to
demonstrate product movement to any speciﬁc ﬁnal end point-of-service. † Distributor X did not have a single physical
location. Product was delivered directly to the various distribution hubs by producer A.)

Fig. 2. Number of cyclosporiasis cases meeting case deﬁnition (N = 227) by date of onset and reported exposure, Iowa
and Nebraska, June–August 2013. * Calculated onset date estimate using 12 days prior to specimen collection (observed
mean for all cases).

A chain A/B exposure was deﬁned as consumption of
51 chain A/B meal 2–14 days prior to illness onset.
Determination of product origin for salad-mix
ingredients
Initial source product records supplied by producer A
in early August 2013 included grower, production,
and distribution information for limited numbers of

products and subcomponents of mixed products.
These records implicated the salad mix but were inadequate to determine a speciﬁc ingredient that was probably contaminated. Further, these data contained
erroneous grower information yet inaccuracies were
not apparent at that time. At the request of FDA, producer A later provided more comprehensive records in
November 2013. This information contained corrected
ﬁeld-level (ranch lot level) grower-speciﬁc data for
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Table 1. Chain A/B restaurant food exposures reported by patrons (N = 77) in a cyclosporiasis investigation and
corresponding odds ratios, Douglas County, Nebraska, June–July 2013
Cases (N = 40)

Controls (N = 37)

Exposed

Not exposed

Exposed

Not exposed

Food

n

(%)

n

(%)

n

(%)

n

(%)

OR (95% CI)

House salad*
Basil†‡
Bread (breadsticks, bruschetta)
Pasta
Shrimp
Chicken
Berry
Any seafood
Caesar salad

38
5
12
8
13
9
3
14
0

(95)
(13)
(30)
(20)
(33)
(23)
(8)
(35)
(0)

2
31
28
32
27
31
37
26
40

(5)
(78)
(70)
(80)
(68)
(78)
(93)
(65)
(100)

19
2
9
11
6
8
0
7
1

(51)
(5)
(24)
(30)
(16)
(22)
(0)
(19)
(3)

18
30
28
26
31
29
37
30
36

(49)
(81)
(76)
(70)
(84)
(78)
(100)
(81)
(97)

18·0 (3·8–85·8)
2·4 (0·4–13·4)
1·3 (0·5–3·7)
0·6 (0·2–1·7)
2·5 (0·8–7·4)
1·1 (0·4–3·1)
Undeﬁned
2·3 (0·8–6·6)
0

OR, Odds ratio; CI, conﬁdence interval.
* House salad contained producer A salad mix.
† Information on basil as an ingredient in all menu items from chains A and B was obtained from the corporate chef.
‡ Basil analysis excluded nine individuals (four ill, ﬁve not ill) for whom basil consumption was unknown.

products shipped from its Mexican production facility
15 May–1 July 2013 including corrected grower information for the salad-mix ingredients of the implicated
PC.
After speciﬁc PCs and deliveries were linked to illnesses, we then used these corrected producer A data to
assess ﬁeld-level grower information to determine which
ingredients in implicated PCs were likely contaminated.
We compared the source ranch lots of ingredients in shipments to the distributor X hubs which were linked to illnesses with shipments to hub(s) not linked to illnesses.

Ethical approval
The investigative activity reported herein underwent
CDC human participants review and was determined
to be public health practice and not research; as such,
Institutional Review Board approval was not required.

R E S ULTS
Case ascertainment
A total of 227 conﬁrmed cyclosporiasis cases were identiﬁed in Iowa (n = 140) and Nebraska (n = 87); reported
illness onset dates ranged from 4 June to 23 August
2013. Median age was 56 years (range 2–92), 136
(60%) were female, 15 (7%) were hospitalized, and no
deaths were reported. Of the 227 ill Iowa and
Nebraska residents, 162 (71%) reported chain A/B

restaurant exposure (100 chain A, 50 chain B, and 12
both); 155 (96%) reported salad consumption (Fig. 2).
Of conﬁrmed ill Wisconsin, Missouri, and Kansas residents, 22% (4/18), 20% (1/5), and 50% (2/4) reported
chain A/B exposure with salad consumption, respectively. In total, 169 persons reported chain A/B exposure
of whom 162 (96%) reported salad consumption.

Douglas County environmental investigation and
case-control study
Both chain A and chain B restaurants used only producer A-supplied salad-mix product for house salads
and both used bottled, processed dressings; no basil,
cilantro, or other lettuce products were added. Both
chains added garnishes to house salads; items in common included onions, tomatoes, and cucumbers.
However, review of invoices demonstrated differing
sources for these products in each chain. Both chains
used producer A chopped romaine for Caesar salad
only and chain B used producer A shredded romaine
only for entrée garnishes and sandwiches.
Forty case-patients (conﬁrmed, n = 27; probable, n
= 13) with illness onsets ranging from 15 June to 2
July and 37 controls were identiﬁed for inclusion in
a convenience sample analysis (Table 1). Dates of exposure ranged from 6 to 25 June 2013. Ninety-ﬁve
percent (38/40) of case-patients reported consuming
chain A/B house salad compared to only 51% (19/
37) of controls [Table 1; odds ratio (OR) 18·0, 95%

Cyclosporiasis outbreak linked to romaine lettuce
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Fig. 3. Distribution channels for producer A salad mix supplied by distributor X distribution hubs to chain A/B
restaurants:*† including those (n = 26) reported by persons conﬁrmed with cyclosporiasis (N = 169‡), June–August 2013.
(* Three distribution channels as provided by distributor X not depicted: from the Wisconsin distribution hub to a
Michigan chain A/B restaurant where no illnesses were reported, and from both the Missouri and Illinois hubs to
Wisconsin chain A/B restaurants (unable to verify the accuracy of the latter two; no illnesses were reported in these two
restaurants). † Locations of all chain A/B restaurants and distribution hubs depicted herein are not intended to represent
the speciﬁc geographical locations within the states in which they are located. No illnesses were reported in South Dakota
but one chain A/B restaurant in the state was linked to a conﬁrmed ill Iowa resident. ‡ Thirteen (7·7%) of 169 conﬁrmed
ill persons who reported chain A/B exposure but could not recall exact location of dining are not represented in this map.)

conﬁdence interval (CI) 3·8–85·8]. No other menu
item exposures had ORs which were statistically
signiﬁcant.

produce shipments and outbound salad mix and
other deliveries to chain A/B restaurants from all
ﬁve regional distribution hubs during 1–10 June
2013 and only the Nebraska hub during 11–21 June.

Regional product traceback

Chain A/B house salad exposure compared to product
distribution and service dates

Producer A shipped product from its Mexican production facility directly to ﬁve distributor X distribution
hubs located in Iowa, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Illinois,
and Missouri (Fig. 1). Any given shipping day at
least two trucks were used. Product packaging and
shipping protocols suggested minimal risk of postpackaging product contamination. Distributor X provided detailed records (including item numbers, delivery
dates, and PCs) on inbound imported producer A

The ﬁve distribution hubs are detailed in Figure 3 with
corresponding chain A/B restaurants in their respective
service areas depicted by state of location. Within the
entire distributor X service area, 169 conﬁrmed ill persons reported chain A/B exposure (Table 2). Of these,
156 (92%) reported exact location of dining; 144 were
exposed in their home states and 12 in neighbouring
states. The number of ill persons per restaurant varied
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widely. Most exposures were reported at chain A/B restaurants supplied by the Iowa (n = 77) and Nebraska
(n = 72) distributor X hubs (Table 3; range/restaurant
1–27 cases). None of the 27 chain A/B restaurants within the Missouri hub’s distribution area were ever
reported by a conﬁrmed ill person.
Figure 4 illustrates PC-speciﬁc producer A shipping
dates, distributor X chain A/B delivery dates, corresponding date ranges of possible service given
14-day product shelf-life, and reported exposure
dates for 120 conﬁrmed ill persons who consumed
house salad. Three Kansas (n = 2) and Missouri
(n = 1) residents reported exposure in Nebraska.
Distributor X did not track and could not name individual PCs included in any deliveries. Thus data to
deﬁne speciﬁc PCs of salad-mix deliveries to each
chain A/B restaurant were lacking. Likewise, neither
company D nor the restaurants tracked PC-speciﬁc information for product received and served. Figure 4
reﬂects this uncertainty listing 2–3 PCs potentially
included in deliveries during a given time period. A
company D representative did indicate that salad-mix
product was invariably served and out of inventory
before use-by dates; however, information to deﬁnitively establish precise timing of product turnover
was lacking. Of 120 ill persons represented in
Figure 4, 105 (88%) reported dining within the possible service of PC-M or PC-T; both were delivered
7–12 June and potentially served up to 17 June.

and romaine (15%) lettuce, carrots (5%), and red cabbage (5%). Table 4 lists distribution by PC of producer
A salad-mix boxes shipped 27 May–10 June to the ﬁve
distributor X hubs for subsequent 1–17 June delivery
to chain A/B restaurants. The selected time period represents dates of product shipments that potentially could
have been in service during the restaurant exposures
reported by ill persons depicted in Figures 3 and 4. Of
the two aforementioned PCs (M and T), PC-M was
only delivered to Nebraska whereas PC-T salad mix
was shipped during 7–12 June to all four distribution
hubs linked to illnesses. This product was available for
consumption 7–17 June in 26 chain A/B restaurants
where the 169 conﬁrmed ill persons reported exposure;
PC-T was not shipped to the Missouri hub, which had
no associated cases of illness (Table 4).
The romaine lettuce used in PC-T salad mix had a
single, common ﬁeld-of-origin (grower R/ranch R/lot
R). Salad mix with four PCs (M, T, U, V) contained
romaine lettuce from this single ﬁeld-of-origin and
was distributed through four of ﬁve distributor X
hubs (Table 4). The Missouri distribution hub never
received salad mix containing romaine lettuce from
this growing ﬁeld either as PC-T or as any other PC
(Table 4, Supplementary Tables S1 and S3). By contrast, source growing ﬁelds for PC-T salad-mix carrots
and red cabbage contributed to a much wider range of
PCs, many of which shipped to the distributor X
Missouri hub that was never connected with a single
ill person (Supplementary Table S2). Further, the
only PC-T iceberg lettuce growing ﬁeld that had contributed to salad mix that was shipped (as either PC-T
or other PCs) to each of the four distribution hubs that
were connected with ill persons was grower P/ranch P/
lot 1 (Supplementary Tables S1 and S2). However,
salad mix containing iceberg lettuce from this growing
ﬁeld was also shipped to the Missouri hub (PC-A6).
Beyond distributor X supply channels, producer A
also shipped large volumes of grower P/ranch P/lot 1
iceberg lettuce in chain A/B salad mix and other
blended salad products to ﬁve distributors located in
Indiana, Maryland, and North and South Carolina
[Supplementary Table S2 (notes)]; these states did
not identify a single outbreak-associated case of
cyclosporiasis during June–August 2013 [2].

Determination of product origin for salad-mix
ingredients

Ill persons with chain A/B house salad exposure
outside the PC-T service window

The salad-mix product implicated in the Douglas
County case-control study contained iceberg (75%)

Figure 4 also demonstrates chain A/B house salad
exposures reported both before (n = 3) and after

Table 2. Number of persons with conﬁrmed
cyclosporiasis reporting restaurant chain A/B exposure
by state and illness onset date, Nebraska and Iowa
region, 2013
Illness onset date, 2013

Iowa
Nebraska
Wisconsin
Kansas
Missouri
Total

1–10
June

11 June–1
July

2 July–14
July

Total

2
2
0
0
0
4

105
51
3
2
1
162

0
2
1
0
0
3

107
55
4
2
1
169

Cyclosporiasis outbreak linked to romaine lettuce
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Table 3. Number of conﬁrmed cyclosporiasis cases (N = 169) reported by distributor X distribution hub state and
hub-speciﬁc mean, median, and range per chain A/B restaurant, Nebraska and Iowa region, 2013
Reported cases
per distribution
hub
State of distribution hub

n

(%)

Chain A/B restaurants
per distribution hub*
n

Iowa
Nebraska
Wisconsin
Illinois
Missouri
Not reported‡

77
72
4
3
0
13

(45·6)
(42·6)
(2·4)
(1·8)
(0·0)
(7·7)

10
15
20
3†
27
n.a.

Reported cases per restaurant by
distribution hub (n)
Mean

Median

Range

7·70
4·80
0·19
0·75
0·00
n.a.

6
2
0
0
0
n.a.

1–27
0–22
0–2
0–3
n.a.
n.a.

n.a., Not available.
* Three distribution channels as provided by distributor X not included: one from the Wisconsin hub to a Michigan chain A/B
restaurant where no illnesses were reported, and one each from the Missouri and Illinois hubs to Wisconsin chain A/B restaurants (the latter two were seemingly inconsistent on the basis of geography and information was lacking to verify accuracy; no
illnesses were reported in either of these two Wisconsin restaurants).
† All three chain A/B restaurants served by the Illinois hub were located in Iowa. This distribution hub did not deliver to any
chain A/B restaurants in Illinois.
‡ Thirteen (7·7%) of 169 conﬁrmed ill persons who reported chain A/B exposure could not recall the exact location of dining.

(n = 12) the time period of possible service of PC-T.
Three conﬁrmed ill Iowans recalled exact dining
dates and house salad consumption during 1–6 June
2013. Of these, two reported illness onset before 9
June (Fig. 2). On 27 May 2013, producer A shipped
salad mix to the Iowa (PC-A1), Illinois (PC-A4),
and Wisconsin (PC-A4) distributor X hubs
(Table 4). The immediately aforementioned producer
A salad-mix shipments of 27 May (supplied to chain
A/B restaurants associated with illness) contained romaine lettuce that originated from grower R/ranch
R/lot Q, a grower R/ranch R ﬁeld most likely proximal to the lot R growing ﬁeld, the romaine supplier
for PC-T – both ﬁelds had sequential identifying
ﬁeld numbers as reported by producer A. The
Nebraska distributor X hub also received grower R/
ranch R/lot Q product as chopped romaine (Table 4,
note); two additional Nebraska cases with illness
onset before 9 June were identiﬁed with chain A/B exposure within this hub’s service area (Fig. 2).
After PC-T salad mix would have been completely
out of inventories, ten ill Iowans dined in ﬁve restaurants during a 5-day period, 18–22 June (Fig. 4). Of
these, one reported (18 June) dining at an Iowa
chain A/B restaurant supplied by the Nebraska hub
on both 14 and 17 June with salad mix containing
grower Y/ranch Z/lot S romaine (Fig. 4, note).
Distribution information was not available for the
Iowa or Illinois distributor X hubs to deﬁnitively

link other restaurants to illnesses. Notwithstanding,
the remaining nine Iowans had patronized locations
served by these hubs which also received salad mix
containing romaine from grower Y/ranch Z/lot S
(Table 4, Supplementary Tables S1 and S3).

D I S C US S I O N
Of 227 laboratory-conﬁrmed cyclosporiasis cases in
Iowa and Nebraska residents, 162 (71%) reported dining
at 23 chain A/B restaurants, 96% reported salad consumption consistent with exposure to producer
A-supplied romaine lettuce. Our regional investigation
identiﬁed seven additional cyclosporiasis cases in
patrons of three Wisconsin chain A/B restaurants and
in Missouri and Kansas residents reporting exposure in
Nebraska. Product distribution records traced back to
individual growing ﬁelds combined with chain A/B
restaurant house salad consumption and known exposure dates linked illnesses to a single production lot code
of romaine lettuce (PC-T). This romaine from a
common-origin growing ﬁeld (grower R/ranch R/lot R)
was the likely cause of cyclosporiasis for chain A/B restaurant patrons with 11 June–1 July 2013 illness onset.
Additional cases in chain A/B patrons with illness
onset both before and after the main cluster appear
related to producer A products that contained romaine
lettuce from at least two other growing ﬁelds although
corroborating evidence presented herein is less

B. F. Buss and others
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Fig. 4. Number of chain A/B restaurant exposures* by dates of dining and timing of corresponding distributor X
deliveries of producer A salad mix by production lot codes, May and June 2013. (* Chain A/B restaurant exposure
deﬁned as dining reported by a conﬁrmed ill person who recalled exact date of patronage and house salad consumption
within 14 days prior to illness onset. † Six Iowa (n = 3), Kansas (n = 2) and Missouri (n = 1) residents reported exposure in
Nebraska. One Iowan reported exposure in South Dakota on 13 June. ‡ Ten Iowa residents dined 18–22 June 2013 in ﬁve
restaurants all probably served by distributor X hubs that had received grower Y/ranch Z/lot S romaine-containing salad
mix on both 7 and 10 June for subsequent delivery. § Lot speciﬁc restaurant delivery information was not retained by the
distributor so only groups of lots reported as being delivered in shipments. ¶ For product shipped both 7 and 10 June,
grower Y/ranch Z/lot S romaine-containing products were shipped from producer A to distribution hubs in Nebraska,
Iowa, and Illinois (Table 4). Restaurant-speciﬁc delivery information was not available for the Iowa or Illinois hubs to
deﬁnitively link product to reported exposures. However, grower Y/ranch Z/lot S romaine was supplied by the Nebraska
hub on both 14 and 17 June to an Iowa chain A/B restaurant where one conﬁrmed ill Iowan reported exposure on 18
June 2013. # For salad-mix product shipped on 14 June, no restaurant-speciﬁc delivery information was available except
for the Nebraska hub. However, grower Y/ranch Z/lot S romaine-containing salad-mix product had been shipped by
producer A for subsequent delivery from hubs in Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois. The Missouri hub also received
a slightly larger amount from this shipment than each of the other distribution hubs but romaine grower was unknown.
** For product shipped on and after 17 June, no restaurant-speciﬁc delivery information was available. However, grower
Y/ranch Z/lot S romaine was no longer included in any producer A salad-mix shipments.

deﬁnitive. In early June, romaine lettuce from a second
grower R/ranch R growing ﬁeld (lot Q; PC-A1 and
PC-A2), presumably adjacent to the main implicated
growing ﬁeld (grower R/ranch R/lot R), was connected
with illnesses in three Iowa residents who consumed
chain A/B house salad during 1–6 June 2013, two of
whom reported symptom onset before 9 June. With
documentation that romaine from this ﬁeld also
shipped to the distributor X Nebraska hub (Supplementary Table S3, note), this contaminated product
can also explain two cases in Nebraska residents
reporting chain A/B exposure and symptom onset before 9 June. With regard to late June onset cases and
known chain A/B house salad consumption after implicated PC-T salad mix would have been completely out
of inventories, romaine lettuce from growers other than
grower R was being supplied in producer A’s salad

mix. Our ﬁndings suggest grower Y/ranch Z/lot S as
a plausible source of potentially contaminated product
in these later shipments. Ultimately, our ﬁndings suggest that two separate growing ﬁelds of one grower
and at least one additional ﬁeld from an entirely different grower probably caused cyclosporiasis in all 169
persons who reported chain A/B exposure within the
distributor X service area.
No information currently exists to explain what event
or factors might have potentially contaminated two
growers’ romaine lettuce. On the basis of preliminary
data and early investigation ﬁndings of a multistate investigation, an FDA Environmental Assessment (EA)
was conducted during 12–19 August 2013 in Mexico;
ﬁve ranches (three iceberg lettuce, one red cabbage,
and one green leaf) and the producer A processing facility were inspected [8]. At that time, the investigation was

Cyclosporiasis outbreak linked to romaine lettuce
Table 4. Romaine lettuce grower of producer A salad-mix shipments to distributor X
distribution hubs by production lot code, shipping date, and state with number of linked
cyclosporiasis cases per hub, Nebraska and Iowa region, 2013
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using data that contained some erroneous grower information. As such, romaine lettuce was not suspected as a
likely vehicle so romaine-growing ranches were not
included in the EA. At inspected locations, no potential
sources of the outbreak pathogen nor signiﬁcant potential routes of contamination of salad products were identiﬁed [8]. Further, we have no information to establish
either the relative locations of grower R/ranch R/lots R
or Q or grower Y/ranch Z/lot S or even their proximity
to either the processing facility or the inspected ranches.
Despite lack of information regarding the romaine
lettuce growing environments, our ﬁndings and the lifecycle of C. cayetanensis suggest possible explanations.
Infected individuals excrete unsporulated oocysts
which then require days to weeks under favourable conditions to sporulate and thus become infective; under laboratory conditions, 7–15 days with an optimum
temperature of 23–27 °C [5]. Given these characteristics, refrigeration temperatures used after harvest and
processing would likely not provide suitable conditions
for sporulation and thus contamination of the
illness-associated romaine lettuce would have had to
occur in the days prior to packaging. C. cayetanensis
oocysts are resistant to many disinfectants including
chlorination at concentrations used for routine disinfection, so any sporulated oocysts that remained after
washing and processing prior to being subjected to refrigeration would still retain infectivity once subjected
to lower temperatures [7]. Given that romainecontaining products were generally shipped and thus
refrigerated within 24 h after harvest [e.g. harvested
26 May and 2 June; shipped 27 May and 3 June
(ranch lots Q and R, respectively)], contamination
with unsporulated oocysts only at the times of harvest,
preprocessing transport, or processing would be unlikely to subsequently yield infective oocysts or cause infection. Further, our ﬁndings do not suggest that
cross-contamination with infective oocysts occurred
during such handling of other growers’ romaine either;
a single growing ﬁeld was linked to the majority of cases
despite being processed and shipped contemporaneously with romaine lettuce that was harvested from grower
Y/ranch Z/lot R and subsequently included in large
volumes of salad mix (PC-AE and PC-AF) supplied
to the Missouri distribution hub (Supplementary
Table S1). Given these insights, we believe that contamination most likely occurred prior to harvest while the
romaine lettuce was still in the growing ﬁelds and a
single point-source contamination event is unlikely.
Possible scenarios for pre-harvest contamination in
two presumably adjacent growing ﬁelds and a third

ﬁeld from a seemingly unrelated grower include totally
independent contamination events; shared, contaminated irrigation water; or a regional, rainwater run-off
event involving at least these three ﬁelds. To better
deﬁne potential sources of romaine lettuce pre-harvest
contamination and to develop mitigation strategies for
prevention, production practices of both growers R
and Y should be investigated focusing on irrigation
water sources and potential for contamination. A
retrospective review of meteorological conditions in
the growing regions during the pre-harvest period
should be included.
Erroneous data was initially provided to FDA in the
early phases of the multistate outbreak investigation
(August 2013) thus precluding timely identiﬁcation of
a source. We suspect errors resulted from data entry
or other unintentional mistakes. Receipt of corrected
grower data in November 2013 allowed us to retrospectively implicate a source farm and growing ﬁeld.
The initial failure to implicate the source of contamination because of erroneous supply chain data underscores a potential critical limitation of epidemiologic
investigations and highlights the need for public health
authorities to validate the accuracy and integrity of
such data. This limitation also underscores the need
for producers to develop systems that efﬁciently capture
accurate supply chain data using automated electronic
systems to eliminate potential data inaccuracies caused
by human error. With respect to ﬁnal distribution,
comprehensive, lot code-speciﬁc information was lacking at points-of-service. Consequently, we were unable
to deﬁne when speciﬁc lot codes were in service, or to
establish grower-speciﬁc attack rates. Further, grower
information was completely lacking for 27 May
Missouri distribution hub salad-mix shipments, so receipt and distribution of grower R/ranch R/lot Q romaine could not be excluded. Finally, the number of
illnesses reported outside the time period of possible
service of PC-T was insufﬁcient to conduct additional
case-control studies and distributor X chain A/B delivery information was not available in Iowa to study connection to later-occurring cases.
Our ﬁndings link the majority of 2013 cyclosporiasis
cases in the Upper Midwest of the United States to romaine lettuce of Mexican origin. Our investigation’s success resulted from correlating occurrence of illnesses (or
lack therefore) to product distribution rather than
points-of-service. By implicating producer A-supplied
romaine lettuce, we enabled product traceforward that
further linked this source to exposures of additional ill
persons beyond Midwest chain A/B restaurants,
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including points-of-service supplied by other distribution channels in Florida, Texas, and Nebraska [10]. A report from Texas also linked at least 25 cases during 2013
to imported cilantro [3]. When combined, collective 2013
investigative ﬁndings link contaminated fresh produce –
imported into the United States from two independent
sources in Mexico – to at least 214 US cyclosporiasis
cases during the summer of 2013 (romaine lettuce, n =
189; cilantro, n = 25) [3, 10]. Collective ﬁndings of traceforward investigations further suggest producer
A-supplied romaine lettuce as possible sources of exposure for all 20 US residents with illness onsets on or before
8 June 2013 and 135 other persons throughout 18 central
and eastern US states with illness onset during 11 June–1
July 2013 [10].
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